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LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD—U.S. COURT JURISDICTION
OVER DISPUTES BETWEEN AMERICAN PROFESSIONAL
ATHLETES AND FOREIGN SPORTS TEAMS
KENNETH A. JACOBSEN*,  NOAH J. GOODMAN**, AND
TRAVIS W. WATSON***
I. INTRODUCTION
In a decision that could have far-reaching consequences for
American professional athletes playing abroad and the foreign
teams that employ them, a federal judge in Philadelphia has ruled
that courts in Pennsylvania had personal jurisdiction over a profes-
sional baseball team from Japan in a contract dispute with a former
player from Pennsylvania.1  While the court’s decision in Lutz v.
Rakuten, Inc.2 was driven by the extensive contacts and communica-
tions between the parties, many of which took place while the
player was in the United States, the decision should serve as a warn-
ing to foreign sports teams that recruit and employ American ath-
letes. Lutz provides hope for those athletes that their grievances
against their former employers might find a welcoming venue in
the United States (U.S.) courts.3  Undoubtedly, the Lutz decision
will likely have significant practical implications given the increas-
ing number of American athletes who play professional sports
abroad.4
* Professor Jacobsen is a full-time law professor who handles occasional cases
on behalf of select clients.  His academic and professional areas of expertise are in
complex civil litigation and sports law.
** Mr. Goodman is a trial attorney at Raynes Lawn Heymeyer in Philadelphia
where he represents individuals and families who have suffered catastrophic inju-
ries.  His practice also includes writing and researching about collective bargaining
issues in professional sports and advocating that various rules, regulations, and
provisions should be altered to improve player rights.
*** Mr. Watson is a J.D. Candidate, Temple University Beasley School of Law,
2021.  He would like to thank Professor Jacobsen and Mr. Goodman for their gui-
dance, encouragement, and allowing his contribution to this Article.
1. See generally Lutz v. Rakuten, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 3d 455, 465 (E.D. Pa. 2019)
(summarizing court decision and noting potential ramifications).
2. 376 F. Supp. 3d 455 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
3. See id.
4. See Mark Bode, Game On: America’s Sports Leagues in Emerging Markets,
HARVARD POLITICS (Sept. 17, 2014), http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/
game-americas-sports-leagues-emerging-markets/ [https://perma.cc/CY72-DKX9]
(181)
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II. U.S. PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES PLAYING ABROAD
The steady growth in the number of American athletes playing
for foreign professional sports teams is most apparent in the sports
of basketball and baseball.5  This increase is no doubt driven by a
number of factors: there are a greater number of professional op-
portunities abroad than in domestic leagues in the U.S.;6 there are
restrictive U.S. draft and free agency rules7 that result in potentially
larger salaries abroad;8 and there are more developmental opportu-
nities abroad for top tier prospects than they have at home.9
A. Professional Basketball Abroad
For many U.S. Division I college basketball players, the pros-
pect of playing professional basketball at the highest domestic level,
such as the National Basketball Association (NBA) or Women’s Na-
tional Basketball Association (WNBA), is remote.10  The National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) “estimate[s] that 4.2% of
draft-eligible Division I players were chosen in the 2018 NBA
draft.”11  Therefore, of the 1,230 eligible players, only fifty-two were
drafted into the NBA.12  However, approximately 839 went on to
(discussing increase in American athletes who have had success in professional
sports leagues overseas).
5. See Kyle Schnitzer, High School Athletes are Taking Professional Routes Abroad to
Get Paid Now, LADDERS (May 29, 2019), https://www.theladders.com/career-ad
vice/high-school-athletes-are-taking-professional-routes-abroad-to-get-paid-now
[https://perma.cc/E4FN-NKBW] (discussing recent decisions by two prominent
amateur prospects to forego college or professional drafts to play abroad).
6. See Elia Powers, When the Madness Ends: How College Hoopsters Navigate Euro-
pean Options, THEPOSTGAME (Apr. 4, 2017), http://www.thepostgame.com/col
lege-basketball-players-march-madness-europe-pro [https://perma.cc/Y3C9-
SLML] (discussing how undrafted college basketball players often go on to have
successful professional international careers).
7. See Des Bieler, LaMelo Ball, 17, Opts for Australian League Ahead of 2020 NBA
Draft, WASH. POST (June 18, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/
2019/06/18/lamelo-ball-age-opts-australian-league-ahead-nba-draft/?utm_term=
.38299cfdd7dd [https://perma.cc/5JCR-3X4F] (highlighting NBA athletes forego
draft decision to go abroad); see also Tyler Kepner, Carter Stewart, 19, Chooses Japan
Over the M.L.B. Draft, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
05/22/sports/carter-stewart-japan.html [https://perma.cc/6EV7-VVYJ] (illustrat-
ing MLB like NBA athletes forego draft decision to go abroad).
8. See Schnitzer, supra note 5 (noting foreign contracts for high school pros-
pects exceed offers from U.S. developmental leagues such as NBA’s G-League).
9. See Bieler, supra note 7.
10. See Estimated Probability of Competing in Professional Athletics, NCAA, http://
www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competing-profes
sional-athletics [https://perma.cc/48W5-JVW4] (last updated Apr. 3, 2019) (dem-
onstrating statistical probabilities).
11. Id.
12. See id.
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play professional basketball internationally or in the NBA’s develop-
mental G-League.13  The 2018 cohort numbers are similar for wo-
men’s basketball, with only thirty-two players being drafted into the
WNBA, while 223 went on to play professional basketball interna-
tionally.14  As of June 2019, a total of 638 men and women played
professional basketball at the highest level in the U.S.—494 in the
NBA and 144 in the WNBA—while 3,014 played professionally over-
seas—2,560 men and 454 women.15
There are two general categories of U.S.-based basketball play-
ers who play professionally overseas: (1) U.S. collegiate basketball
players who go undrafted,16 and (2) players whose diminishing do-
mestic career prospects have landed them on foreign teams.17
There is also a potential third category emerging: high school-aged
basketball players opting to play overseas rather than play U.S. col-
legiate basketball—the traditional path for many highly rated
American prospects.18
Teenage players choosing to play professional basketball over-
seas after graduation from high school is a recent phenomenon.19
In 2019, LaMelo Ball and RJ Hampton, two highly rated prospects,
chose to play professional basketball in Australia rather than on an
13. See id. (identifying number of 2018 draft-eligible men’s collegiate basket-
ball players who played internationally, in G-League, or in NBA as undrafted
players).
14. See id.
15. See Americans Overseas, USBASKET, https://www.usbasket.com/Americans-
Overseas.asp [https://perma.cc/PJ9L-8P6U] (last visited June 6, 2019) (listing ath-
letes playing in foreign countries).
16. See generally TJ Mathewson, How Basketball Players Go Pro in Different Coun-
tries, GLOBAL SPORT MATTERS (Dec. 13, 2018), https://globalsportmatters.com/
business/2018/12/13/how-do-basketball-players-go-pro-in-different-countries/
[https://perma.cc/5TSM-BGUA] (comparing NBA G-League with playing profes-
sional basketball overseas); cf. Don Markus, Seeking Lane into NBA, Undrafted Players
Turn to Development and Overseas Leagues, BALTIMORE SUN (Jun. 20, 2017), https://
www.baltimoresun.com/sports/terps/bs-sp-nba-draft-avenues-0621-20170620-
story.html [https://perma.cc/DR6E-TBE8] (noting NBA G-League may be better
path to NBA than playing overseas).
17. See Luke Adams, NBA Players Who Are Headed Overseas For 2018/19, HOOPS
RUMOR (Aug. 8, 2018) https://www.hoopsrumors.com/2018/08/nba-players-who-
are-headed-overseas-for-201819.html [https://perma.cc/465R-YLRC] (“[T]here
simply aren’t enough roster spots around the league to accommodate all the play-
ers who spent time with NBA clubs last season.”).
18. See Howard L. Nixon, Sport in a Changing World, PARADIGM PUBLISHERS
(Feb. 2018) at 319–320 (discussing alternative path to professional sports).
19. See Michael Creepy, The Perks of Playing Basketball Overseas, THE UN-
DEFEATED (June 21, 2018), https://theundefeated.com/features/the-perks-of-play-
ing-basketball-overseas/ [https://perma.cc/27VP-C5T7] (explaining that teenage
basketball players have recently elected to sign professional contracts in foreign
countries because it is financially lucrative and provides unique cultural
experiences).
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NCAA Division I team, garnering much attention.20  While both
Hampton and Ball pointed to the similarity in style between Austra-
lian and American basketball, many commentators were quick to
attribute their choices to the NBA’s “one-and-done” rule.21
Current NBA rules require that to be eligible for the draft; (1)
the player must be over the age of nineteen, and (2) a minimum of
one NBA season has elapsed since the player’s high school gradua-
tion.22  Article X of the NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement is
referred to as the “one-and-done” rule and was instituted in 2006
with the consent of both team ownership and the players associa-
tion—the union which represents the NBA players.23  While only a
handful of graduating high school players have opted to play pro-
fessionally overseas, increasing salary potential in leagues like Aus-
tralia may be changing that calculus.24  The NBA’s recent
announcement that it is in the process of reconsidering the “one-
and-done” rule may be further evidence of the threat of foreign-
based teams recruiting highly touted U.S. high school prospects.25
By far, basketball accounts for the most significant portion of
U.S.-based professional athletes on foreign teams; this is the result
of the potential for larger foreign contracts and the competitiveness
of NBA play.  Given the worldwide popularity of basketball, it is an-
ticipated that, despite any reconsideration of the “one-and-done”
rule, the number of U.S.-based basketball players playing abroad
professionally will continue to increase, and for greater amounts of
money.
B. Professional Baseball Overseas
The number of U.S.-based baseball players playing overseas
professionally is dramatically smaller than in basketball, but re-
mains significant in Japan and South Korea, where baseball is a
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See 2017 NBA-NBPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, art. X, § 1,
available at https://cosmic-s3.imgix.net/3c7a0a50-8e11-11e9-875d-3d44e94ae33f-
2017-NBA-NBPA-Collective-Bargaining-Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SB7-
ATNF] (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) (providing collective agreement).
23. See Michael McCann, Examining What a Change to the NBA’s One-and-Done
Rule Could Mean for All Involved, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 3, 2019), https://
www.si.com/nba/2019/03/03/legal-analysis-change-age-eligibility-rule-one-and-
done [https://perma.cc/LMV7-GL4X] (noting high school athletes are absent
from negotiations despite impact on lives and careers).
24. See Bieler, supra note 7.
25. See id. (“By 2022 the league will likely rid of its rule mandating draft-eligi-
ble players spend at least one year out [of] high school.”).
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popular sport.26  One source estimates “as many as 100 ex-major or
minor leaguers played in either [Japan’s Nippon Professional Base-
ball League] or [the Korea Baseball Organization] last year.”27  A
review of last year’s rosters of each major league’s players shows that
for 2019, twenty-eight U.S.-based players were active in the Nippon
Professional Baseball League (NPB) and twenty-four U.S.-based
players were active in the Korea Baseball Organization (KBO).28
Although highly rated prospects from high school and college
fare only slightly better in ascending to U.S. professional baseball
than in the NBA—0.5% from high school and 9.8% from college—
their presence in Asia is unlikely to increase despite the overwhelm-
ing odds against them in the U.S.29  Since the NPB limits the total
number of foreign players on each team to four and the KBO to
three, the number of U.S.-based baseball players in Asia is capped
and unlikely to increase significantly in the near or long term.30
There are, however, unique monetary incentives for young
baseball players to participate in the NPB over the MLB draft.
Rather than spending years working their way under contract
through the U.S. minor-league system, top college-age prospects
can have greater immediate earning potential in the NPB, and
enter MLB free agency sooner.31  For example, instead of entering
the MLB draft, nineteen year old Carter Stewart, a pitcher for East-
ern Florida State College, signed a six-year, seven million dollar
26. See Christine Bagarino, How Did Baseball Become So Popular in Japan?, CUL-
TURE TRIP (June 28, 2017), https://theculturetrip.com/asia/japan/articles/how-
did-baseball-become-so-popular-in-japan/ [https://perma.cc/6UPP-9S5Z] (“[I]n
Japan the game has reached such heights of popularity that some Japanese people
fail to realize that the sport is not native to the country.”); see also Top 10 Most
Popular Sports in South Korea as of May 2017, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/
statistics/829536/south-korea-most-popular-sports/ [https://perma.cc/F6QY-
RFM9] (last visited Sept. 4, 2019) (noting 62% percent of South Korean’s popula-
tion stated it was their favorite sport).
27. Kyle Glaser, Players Seek Riches, Opportunity in Japan and Korea, BASEBALL
AMERICA (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.baseballamerica.com/stories/players-seek-
riches-opportunity-in-japan-and-korea/ [https://perma.cc/Z7KM-JWWM] (high-
lighting financial opportunities for athletes in Asia).
28. See generally Professional Baseball History, SPORTS REFERENCE, https://
www.baseball-reference.com/register [https://perma.cc/7LHZ-3PY5]; see also KBO
Foreign Players, MYKBO STATS, https://mykbostats.com/players/foreign [https://
perma.cc/Z3FD-YRSN].
29. See Probability of Playing College and Professional Baseball, HS BASEBALL WEB,
http://www.hsbaseballweb.com/probability.htm [https://perma.cc/228P-HNV4]
(last visited Sept. 4, 2019); see supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text.
30. See Glaser, supra note 27.
31. See Kepner, supra note 7.
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contract with incentives to play for the NPA’s Fukuoka SoftBank
Hawks.32
The U.S. export of professional baseball players appears gener-
ally limited to Japan and Korea.  This number appears unlikely to
increase absent significant structural changes to their leagues’
rules.  Although the aggregate number of U.S. players may remain
low, there exists the potential for increased incentives for both
younger and experienced players who elect to start—or end—their
professional baseball careers in those counties.
III. THE RAKUTEN LITIGATION
A. Overview
On August 30, 2017, Zach Lutz, a former MLB player for the
New York Mets, filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
against Rakuten Baseball, Inc., a Japanese baseball company that
owns and operates the Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles (the
“Golden Eagles”), and Rakuten Inc. (“Rakuten”), a Japanese e-com-
merce company and the corporate parent of the Golden Eagles, for
failing to renew Lutz’s contract to play for the Golden Eagles for
the 2015 season.33
Lutz alleged that senior management of the Golden Eagles
broke promises and made false statements to him in Pennsylvania,
and to his agents in California, that the team would enter into a
new contract with him at specified terms including a guaranteed
base salary of $700,000 plus incentive bonuses and expense reim-
bursements.34  These terms were embodied in a written contract
drafted by the Golden Eagles and its lawyers and signed by Lutz the
day after he received it at his home in Pennsylvania.35  Nonetheless,
the Golden Eagles, despite months of negotiations and assurances
to Lutz that he would play “an important role” during the 2015
season, refused to countersign the contract, insisting during the liti-
gation that negotiations had been ongoing and were incomplete.36
During their negotiations, the Golden Eagles kept Lutz on its
“Reserve List,” preventing Lutz and his agents from even contact-
32. See id.
33. See generally Compl. at ¶ 1, Lutz v. Rakuten, Inc., No. 5:17-cv-03895-CFK
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2017), ECF No. 1 (indicating Mr. Jacobsen was counsel for Lutz
during litigation and noting Lutz played for Golden Eagles during 2014 season
before injuring his thumb during a game which required him to return to United
States for surgery as well as physical therapy).
34. See id. at ¶ 49.
35. See id. at ¶¶ 49–52.
36. See id. at ¶¶ 40, 53.
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ing, let alone negotiating with, any other professional baseball team
in the world, likewise preventing those teams from contacting him
about playing for their team.37  When the Golden Eagles informed
Lutz that they would not sign the contract, were ceasing any further
negotiations, and removing Lutz from its “Reserve List,” it was too
late for Lutz to find another team to play for in Japan.38  Instead,
Lutz signed a contract to play for a professional baseball team in
Korea at substantially less compensation and with far fewer incen-
tives than those in the final agreement tendered to him by the
Golden Eagles and signed by Lutz the day he received it.39
Rakuten and the Golden Eagles moved to dismiss Lutz’s Com-
plaint under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
for lack of personal jurisdiction.40  They contended it violated con-
stitutional principles of due process to litigate Lutz’s claims for
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel in
Pennsylvania.41
On April 22, 2019, the court issued its decision in Lutz v.
Rakuten, Inc.,42 and held in a groundbreaking opinion that the
Golden Eagles were subject to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania
due to its extensive and protracted contacts and communications
with Lutz over their four month period of contract negotiations.43
Although the court dismissed Lutz’s claims against Rakuten for lack
of personal jurisdiction, it endorsed the notion that an interna-
tional conglomerate such as Rakuten could be subject to personal
jurisdiction in a United States court if its marketing strategy targets
citizens of a particular state that was central to its business.44
37. See id. at ¶¶ 53, 55.
38. See id. at ¶¶ 57–59.
39. See id. at ¶ 59.
40. See generally Memorandum in Support of Defendants Rakuten Baseball,
Inc.’s, Rakuten, Inc.’s, and Hiroshi Mikitani’s Motions to: (1) Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction Under Rule 12(b)(2); (2) Dismiss or Stay Pending Resolu-
tion of a Parallel Proceeding in Japan and on Grounds of Forum Non Conveniens;
and (3) Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6), Lutz v. Rakuten,
Inc., No. 5:17-cv-03895-CFK, 2017 WL 11516381 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2017), ECF No.
11; Memorandum in Support of Defendants Rakuten, Inc.’s and Rakuten Baseball,
Inc.’s Renewed Motions to Dismiss: (1) for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Under
Rule 12(b)(2); and (2) for Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6), Lutz,
2019 WL 8370826, ECF No. 42.
41. See generally Lutz, 2017 WL 11516381, ECF No. 11; Lutz, 2019 WL 8370826,
ECF No. 42.
42. 376 F. Supp. 455 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
43. See generally id. at 476 (explaining personal jurisdiction ramifications on
future athletic contracts).
44. See id. at 465–66.
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The Lutz decision opens the door for professional athletes to
file lawsuits in the United States against foreign entities that employ
them.  It also provides a roadmap for lawyers to creatively plead
claims against foreign professional sports teams—and potentially
the international conglomerates that own them—to resolve employ-
ment disputes.  By recruiting and employing athletes while those
athletes reside in the United States, foreign professional sports
teams run the risk of subjecting themselves to U.S. federal and state
laws—a key development for the rights of U.S.-based professional
athletes.
B. The Parties
1. Plaintiff Zach Lutz
Zach Lutz grew up in Berks County, Pennsylvania.45  After
graduating from his local high school, Lutz attended Alvernia Col-
lege in Pennsylvania from 2005–2007, where he starred as a base-
ball player.46  Lutz earned first team All American each of his three
years at Alvernia and won the Division III National Player of the
Year in 2007.47
Lutz became a sought after professional baseball player be-
cause of his illustrious collegiate career.48  In 2007, the New York
Mets drafted him in the fifth round of the MLB draft.49  Lutz went
on to play for the Mets organization for the next six years, ulti-
mately making his MLB debut for the club in 2012.50  After spend-
ing portions of the 2012 and 2013 seasons with the Mets, Lutz—like
many other U.S.-based professional baseball players—pursued an
opportunity to continue his career in Japan, signing a lucrative con-
tract with the Golden Eagles for the 2014 season.51
45. See Compl. at ¶ 3, supra note 33.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at ¶ 4.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. ¶¶ 24, 50; see also Danny Abriano, Zach Lutz Heading to Japan to Play
for Rakuten, RISING APPLE (June 11, 2014), https://risingapple.com/2014/06/11/
zach-lutz-heading-japan-play-rakuten/ [https://perma.cc/N9TJ-DQWE] (describ-
ing personal opportunity for Lutz to leave U.S. for Japan).
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2. Defendant Rakuten
Rakuten is one of the largest international e-commerce and in-
ternet services companies in the world.52  While Rakuten is incorpo-
rated and headquartered in Japan, it is a global conglomerate with
offices throughout the world, including a number in the United
States.53  Through its extensive divisions and consolidated subsidiar-
ies based in thirty countries, Rakuten provides online retail services,
sports and entertainment events and partnerships, and other ser-
vices and products globally to billions of customers.54
In order to service its vast business operations, Rakuten has es-
tablished technology centers and institutes in several cities in the
United States.55  These entities focus on research and development
in advanced internet technologies to further Rakuten’s diverse busi-
ness activities.56  Rakuten’s website boasts of its extensive global bus-
iness holdings under the broad name “Rakuten Group,” describing
the integration of its various businesses into a single integrated en-
terprise which it labels the Rakuten “ecosystem”:
We have since grown to offer services across finance,
sports and entertainment and more.  We’ve partnered
with businesses around the world that share the same val-
ues as us.  Now, we’re bringing these diverse elements to-
gether in one ecosystem, united under the Rakuten
umbrella.57
On its website, Rakuten also emphasizes that its “ecosystem” is
an integrated one that cuts across all its business entities:
At the same time, development and design of common
group platform functions such as Rakuten IDs, points, and
checkout payment will continue to be managed by a
group-wide team, in order to further enrich the customer
benefits offered by the Rakuten Ecosystem.58
52. See generally About Us, RAKUTEN, https://global.rakuten.com/corp/about/
[https://perma.cc/2X6W-VZVW] (last visited Jan. 27, 2020) (“Rakuten Group as
70+ businesses and almost 1.3 billion members across the world.”).
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See About, RAKUTEN INST. TECH., https://rit.rakuten.co.jp/about/ [https:/
/perma.cc/YT85-KATZ] (last visited Jan. 27, 2020) (illustrating map of cities).
56. See id.
57. Compl. at ¶ 9, supra note 33.
58. Rakuten Introduces Company System to Enhance Customer-Centricity, RAKUTEN
(Apr. 1, 2016), https://global.rakuten.com/corp/news/press/2016/0401_01.html
[https://perma.cc/7GYB-LZA6] (emphasizing integration).
9
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To this same point, further unifying its various businesses in its
integrated “ecosystem” under the Rakuten umbrella, the company
changed its global logo, which appears on its website.59  Consistent
with the integrated nature of its multiple businesses in the United
States and abroad, Rakuten employees all have a common e-mail
address, “@mail.rakuten.com”, including individuals who work for
the Golden Eagles.60
Rakuten calls its global subsidiaries—including those in the
United States—“services” provided by Rakuten to its global mem-
bers, not independent, stand-alone corporate entities.61  Rakuten
has 120 million members in the United States—more than the 90
million in its home country of Japan.62  As Rakuten states in its an-
nual reports, its members “access a variety of services” through its
affiliates using the same member identification number, creating
what Rakuten calls a unified, integrated “Ecosystem.”63  This “one-
stop access” and “organic linkage” of all of Rakuten’s businesses
(i.e., “services”) creates a unified, integrated enterprise with
Rakuten at its core.
Rakuten collects customer data—including demographics,
search and browsing history, purchase history, and other “Big
Data”—from all of these transactions, runs it through the “Rakuten
Analytics Tracker” and its member “Behavior log,” and uses this
data to forecast demand for its “services,” to optimize inventory and
pricing, and to target its members for discounts and coupons.64
None of this is done by Rakuten’s U.S. affiliates; all is done by
Rakuten itself. Indeed, Rakuten operates two “Rakuten Institutes of
Technology” in the United States—one in New York and one in
Boston—staffed by engineers and researchers to provide technical
support and development for its “services” here.65
Rakuten’s primary subsidiary in the United States, Rakuten
USA, Inc., operates an e-commerce website which sells products on-
59. See Rakuten Introduces New Brand Symbol, RAKUTEN (Sept. 8, 2018), https://
global.rakuten.com/corp/news/press/2018/0908_01.html [https://perma.cc/
64TB-9JNG] (illustrating new logo).
60. See Compl. at ¶ 16, supra note 33.
61. See id. at ¶¶ 5–20; see also About Us, RAKUTEN, supra note 52.
62. See Empowerment Through Innovations Corporate Report 2017, RAKUTEN,
https://global.rakuten.com/corp/investors/documents/annual.html [https://
perma.cc/2ZFG-5H7W].
63. See id.
64. See Compl. at ¶ 13, supra note 33.
65. See About, RAKUTEN INST. TECH., supra note 55. Rakuten has similar Insti-
tutes in Japan, Europe and elsewhere. See id.
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line throughout the United States.66  Rakuten subsidiary Ebates so-
licits customers throughout the country to purchase products
through its e-commerce platform, allowing those customers to pay
for their purchases through their computers and phones located in
the United States.67  Prominently displayed and promoted through-
out its targeted television and other advertisements is that Ebates is
“A Rakuten Company,” manifesting Rakuten’s clear intent to solicit
and profit from its business activities in the United States.68
Rakuten Kobo sells e-books online directly to purchasers in the
United States as well as through Walmart’s website and “brick and
mortar” stores in this country under a partnership announced in
2018.69
Rakuten Card USA, is registered as a foreign corporation in
Pennsylvania, thereby consenting to general jurisdiction in Penn-
sylvania and generating substantial revenue and data that directly
benefits Rakuten from its activities here.70  Rakuten “service” com-
pany Rakuten Commerce, LLC operates a fully interactive website
in Pennsylvania which allows customers to purchase goods from
their residences in Pennsylvania and ship those goods to their resi-
dences without ever leaving this Commonwealth.71  Rakuten Mar-
keting prominently promotes its inextricable intertwinement with
Rakuten on its website:
66. See Ebates: We’re Now Rakuten, RAKUTEN, https://www.rakuten.com [https:/
/perma.cc/3XVK-7HXF] (last visited Jan. 27, 2020) (describing change in com-
pany name).
67. See id.
68. See https://www.rakuten.com/?ebdirect=true&httpredirect=true [https:/
/perma.cc/3X6K-N4B7] (last visited Jan. 27, 2020) (redirecting Ebates website to
Rakuten website and noting “A Rakuten Company” appears).
69. See Walmart and Rakuten Announce New Strategic Alliance, WALMART (Jan. 25,
2018), https://corporate.walmart.com/newsroom/2018/01/25/walmart-and-
rakuten-announce-new-strategic-alliance [https://perma.cc/7A7V-SQZ3] (describ-
ing new partnership designed for future market success).
70. See Announcement for Resolution to Establish a Company for Banking Operations
in the United States, RAKUTEN (July 26, 2019), https://global.rakuten.com/corp/
news/press/2019/0726_06.html?year=2019&month=7&category=corp
%20ir%20fintech [https://perma.cc/9VQZ-RD2R] (describing process of jurisdic-
tion in United States).
71. See id.
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The Rakuten Ecosystem
Membership
Rakuten, Inc. Global Company Worldwide Members In
6th Largest 10,000 + 1.1 billionInternet Service 230+ CountriesEmployees ConsumersProvider
Rakuten Marketing is built on a legacy of empowerment through its rela-
tionship with Rakuten, Inc.
We leverage the power of Rakuten ecosystem data to identify audi-
ences, optimize media buying, personalize ad experiences and maxi-
mize incremental revenue for our clients. Our global presence allows
us to engage and influence consumers worldwide.72
Rakuten itself has deeply intertwined itself with the NBA to lev-
erage the goodwill generated by its association with that organiza-
tion and its member teams.  Toward that same end, Rakuten also
has formed separate partnerships with the Golden State Warriors
and its superstar player, Steph Curry, who regularly plays in Penn-
sylvania, prominently displaying Rakuten’s logo on their jerseys in
direct promotion to fans in Philadelphia.73  Rakuten negotiated a
separate partnership arrangement directly with the NBA to sell
merchandise of NBA teams, including the Philadelphia 76ers, on a
global level through its e-commerce platform.74
In an effort to expand its global brand into the sports and en-
tertainment industries, Rakuten has signed recent partnership
agreements with some of the world’s best-known professional
teams.  For example, in July 2017, Rakuten signed an endorsement
deal with FC Barcelona, agreeing to pay the club sixty million dol-
lars annually for four years to display the Rakuten name and logo
on team jerseys.75  Likewise, in September 2017, Rakuten signed a
72. Rakuten Marketing, RAKUTEN, https://rakutenmarketing.com [https://
perma.cc/4AHG-GSF4?type=image] (updated Oct. 24, 2018) (illustrating market-
ing ecosystem).
73. See Steven Impey, NBA Star Stephen Curry Becomes Rakuten’s US Ambassador,
SPORTS PRO MEDIA (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.sportspromedia.com/news/nba-
stephen-curry-rakuten-underrated-ambassador [https://perma.cc/P6WG-2QDN].
74. See Sam Amick, NBA Expands Global Reach with Massive Deal with Rakuten,
USA TODAY (Oct. 9, 2017, 10:17 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/
nba/2017/10/09/nba-expands-global-reach-massive-deal-rakuten/748631001/
[https://perma.cc/3UU4-JRKH] (“We want to be a household name like Google
and Facebook . . . .”); see also Warriors Ink Lucrative Jersey Deal With Rakuten, YAHOO!
SPORTS (Sept. 12, 2017), https://sports.yahoo.com/warriors-ink-lucrative-jersey-
deal-rakuten-231124242—nba.html [https://perma.cc/5B5C-N9Z4] (quoting
Rakuten CEO Hiroshi Mikitani).
75. See Rakuten Sponsorship Deal with FC Barcelona Begins, FC BARCELONA, (July
1, 2017, 6:45 AM), https://www.fcbarcelona.com/en/news/752333/rakuten-spon
sorship-deal-with-fc-barcelona-begins [https://perma.cc/V58V-ZR3D] (noting en-
dorsement deals).
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sponsorship deal also worth sixty million dollars with the Golden
State Warriors to promote its global “ecosystem” by displaying its
logo on a patch on the team’s jerseys—effectively targeting consum-
ers in each of the twenty seven United States cities where the War-
riors play and in millions of households worldwide through
television and other media.76  Rakuten’s “partnerships” with these
“internationally beloved” teams is prominently displayed on its web-
site, highlighting the company philosophy that sports have the abil-
ity to “unite the world.”77
Rakuten’s founder and Chairman Hiroshi Mikitani personally
appeared in San Francisco to announce the Rakuten-Warriors part-
nership, posing for newspaper and television cameras with War-
riors’ executives and star players Draymond Green and Andre
Iguodala.78  The Warriors’ practice facility was renamed the
“Rakuten Performance Center.”79  Under the deal, Rakuten also be-
came the official e-commerce, video-on-demand and affiliate mar-
keting partner of the Warriors.  Ebates became the Warriors’
official shopping rewards partner.  The global messaging service Vi-
ber became the Warriors official instant messaging and calling app
partner.  Another affiliate, Rakuten Kobo, which has its own part-
nership arrangement with Wal-Mart, became the Warriors’ official
e-book partner.80
Rakuten reports all its financial data and financial perform-
ance on a consolidated basis for all of its businesses throughout the
world, including its American subsidiaries.81  In 2018, Rakuten re-
76. See Maury Brown, Inside The Golden State Warriors’ $60 Million Jersey Patch
Deal With Rakuten, FORBES, (Nov. 27, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/maurybrown/2017/11/27/inside-the-golden-state-warriors-record-60-million-
jersey-patch-deal-with-rakuten/#49bd08437b59 [https://perma.cc/5CLM-C9KE]
(noting details of endorsement); see also, Jeremy Woo, What is Rakuten? A Brief Ex-
planation of the Warriors, Barcelona Jersey Sponsor, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, (Oct. 17,
2017), https://www.si.com/extra-mustard/2017/rakuten-warriors-barcelona-
jersey-sponsor-uniform-patch [https://perma.cc/Z79D-VT53] (explaining
sponsor).
77. See generally Sports & Entertainment, RAKUTEN, https://global.rakuten.com/
corp/about/sports_entertainment/ [https://perma.cc/76MQ-UZ6J] (last visited
Jan. 27, 2020).
78. See Ed Odeven, Warriors an Inspiration to Rakuten CEO Hiroshi Mikitani, THE
JAPAN TIMES (June 30, 2018) https://www.japantimes.co.jp/sports/2018/06/30/
basketball/warriors-inspiration-rakuten-ceo-hiroshi-mikitani/#.XoDOP24pDBI
[https://perma.cc/28UE-REC9].
79. See Angel Au-Yeung, Japanese Firm Rakuten Signs Sponsorship Deal with NBA’s
Golden State Warriors, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/sites/angelauyeung/2017/
09/13/japanese-firm-rakuten-signs-sponsorship-deal-with-nbas-golden-state-warri-
ors/#5afb754864e7 [https://perma.cc/JDX6-Y58Y].
80. See Brown, supra note 76.
81. See Compl. at ¶ 18, supra note 33.
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ported that its consolidated businesses had earned revenues of
nearly ten billion dollars.82
3. The Golden Eagles
The Golden Eagles are a Japanese professional baseball team
that is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Rakuten.83  The Golden Eagles
play in NPB’s Pacific League, one of two Japanese professional base-
ball leagues.84  Mr. Mikitani—a self-professed fan of professional
baseball—was personally involved in the establishment of the
Golden Eagles in 2005 as an expansion team in the Pacific
League.85  Like FC Barcelona and the Golden State Warriors, the
Golden Eagles prominently display the Rakuten logo on their
jerseys.86
In contrast to their United States counterparts, professional
baseball teams in Asia are typically owned and operated by large,
diversified corporate enterprises like Rakuten.87  Many professional
baseball teams in Asia, including the Golden Eagles, bear the name
of their corporate owners and serve as marketing, promotion and
advertising vehicles for the corporate enterprise both domestically
and internationally.88
As is common with professional baseball teams in Asia, the
Golden Eagles have negotiated contracts with several prominent
former United States professional baseball players to play for the
team.89  These players include: Andrew Jones, Gaby Sanchez, Jonny
Gomes, Kevin Youkilis, Luis Lopez, Gary Rath, Eric Valent, Andy
Tracy, and others.90  Due to the globalization of the labor market in
professional baseball, representatives from the Golden Eagles travel
to the United States to scout players, attend meetings, and corre-
82. See Julia Engelman, Annual Net Revenue of the Rakuten Group From Fiscal Year
2011 to 2018, STATISTICA, (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/
223327/consolidated-sales-of-the-rakuten-group-since-2007/ [https://perma.cc/
873Y-P6EL] (illustrating revenue in consolidated table).
83. See generally Sports & Entertainment, RAKUTEN supra note 77.
84. See id.
85. See generally Welcome to the Home of Tohoku Rakuten Eagles, RAKUTEN EAGLES,
https://www.rakuteneagles.jp/global/english/ [https://perma.cc/4VD3-W22F]
(last visited Jan. 27, 2020).
86. See id.
87. See Compl. at ¶ 23, supra note 33.
88. See id.
89. See Keiji Kawai & Matt Nichol, International Sports Law Perspective Labor in
Nippon Professional Baseball and the Future of Player Transfers to Major League Baseball,
25 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 491, 524 (2015) (detailing the recruitment activities of
international professional teams as part of baseball’s “global labor market”).
90. See Compl. at ¶ 24–25, supra note 33.
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spond with baseball players in the United States to negotiate over
the terms and conditions of their employment.91
C. Factual Allegations
1. The Underlying Dispute Between Lutz and the Japanese Entities
Following his career with the New York Mets, Lutz signed a
lucrative contract with the Golden Eagles to play in the Nippon
League for the 2014 season.92  Lutz’s season with the Golden Ea-
gles, however, was cut short when he was hit by a pitch during a
game in July 2014 and fractured his thumb.93  After a period of
unsuccessful treatment in Japan, Lutz returned to his home in
Pennsylvania in September 2014 for surgery and rehabilitation.94
Following Lutz’s return to his home state,95 Akihoto Sasaki
(“Sasaki”), Special Assistant to the Rakuten Golden Eagles General
Manager, began a series of e-mail and telephone communications
directly with Lutz and his agents, MVP Sports Group in Los Ange-
les, over the terms of a new contract for the 2015 season.96  While
negotiations continued during the fall of 2014 and with proposals
and terms being discussed for the 2015 season and beyond, the
Golden Eagles closely monitored Lutz’s injury and rehabilitation.97
This communications included documents from Lutz’s doctors de-
tailing the procedure that Lutz underwent to repair his fractured
thumb, and reports from Lutz’s physical therapist about his rehabil-
itation and fitness to return to the team for the 2015 season.98  One
example of the dozens of communications during this period is an
email on October 13, 2014; Lutz sent an e-mail from his home in
Pennsylvania to Sasaki, informing him that: “[E]verything is going
91. See id. at ¶ 26; see also Noah J. Goodman, The Evolution and Decline of Free
Agency in Major League Baseball: How the 2012–2016 Collective Bargaining Agreement Is
Restraining Trade, 23 SPORTS L.J. 19, 55 (2016) (highlighting globalization of labor
market in professional baseball); Kawai & Nichol, supra note 89, at 523 (detailing
professional baseball’s global labor market).
92. See Compl. at ¶ 33, supra note 33; see also Abriano, supra note 51.
93. See Compl. at ¶¶ 33–36, supra note 33; see also Bartt Davis, Lutz Happy to be
Back in the States, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, (July 20, 2015, 4:59 PM), https://
www.reviewjournal.com/sports/lutz-happy-to-be-back-in-states/ [https://
perma.cc/M6RV-Y3VC] (summarizing interview).
94. See Compl. at ¶¶ 36–37, supra note 33.
95. See id. ¶¶ 34–37 (noting Lutz never changed his state or country of domi-
cile and continued to maintain his primary residence, bank accounts, income taxes
on Golden Eagles earnings in Pennsylvania, thus he called Pennsylvania his home
in other respects).
96. See id. at ¶ 34.
97. See id. at ¶¶ 34, 36–41.
98. See id. at ¶ 37.
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great with my thumb.”99  In response, Sasaki wrote to Lutz in Penn-
sylvania stating that he was pleased “everything is going good with
[Lutz’s] thumb” and the Golden Eagles were reviewing Lutz’s X-
rays “with our doctor.”100  Just a few days later, Sasaki wrote to Lutz,
while Lutz was in Pennsylvania, stating the Golden Eagles were con-
fident that he would play “an important role” for the team during
the 2015 season.101
In addition to requesting medical records from his doctors in
the United States and communicating with him repeatedly con-
cerning the new contract, the Golden Eagles also wired his 2014
salary and a buyout of his contract at the end of 2014 directly into
Lutz’s Pennsylvania bank account.102
On November 27, 2014, following months of communication
and negotiation, Lutz and the Golden Eagles agreed to a one-year
contract for the 2015 season.103  The contract guaranteed Lutz
$700,000 in base salary plus lucrative incentive bonuses and ex-
penses.104  After agreeing to those terms, representatives from the
Golden Eagles called Lutz at his home in Pennsylvania on
Thanksgiving Day to welcome him back to the team.105
Over the next week, representatives from the Golden Eagles,
including Sasaki, communicated repeatedly with Lutz in Penn-
sylvania and his agents in Los Angeles via telephone and e-mail to
finalize the contract for the 2015 season, ultimately e-mailing the
“final agreement” to Lutz at his Pennsylvania home on December 5,
2014.106  The next day, on December 6, 2014, Lutz signed and re-
turned the contract to the Golden Eagles.107  Based on that con-
tract and the security it provided, Lutz and his wife purchased a
new home in Pennsylvania and used his guaranteed salary as proof
of income to obtain a mortgage.108
The Golden Eagles, however, never countersigned the con-
tract, instead insisting that Lutz provide more medical information
99. Id. at ¶ 38.
100. Id. at ¶ 39.
101. See id.
102. See generally Lutz v. Rakuten, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 3d 455, 465 (E.D. Pa.
2019) (explaining Lutz’s medical and financial dealings in Pennsylvania, among
other things).
103. See Compl. at ¶ 44, supra note 33.
104. See id.
105. See id. at ¶ 45.
106. See id. at ¶¶ 46–49.
107. See id. at ¶ 50.
108. See id. at ¶ 52.
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on the status of his thumb.109  During this entire period, Lutz re-
mained on the Golden Eagles’ “Reserve List,” which under NPB’s
rules barred Lutz from even communicating with, let alone negoti-
ating, a new contract with any other team in the world.110  Lutz re-
mained on the “Reserve List” for several crucial weeks before finally
being released from the Reserve Clause by Rakuten in late Decem-
ber 2014.111  The rosters of other NPB teams were already filled for
the 2015 season at that point, accordingly Lutz signed a contract in
January 2015 with the Doosan Bears of the KBO for $550,000—
$150,000 less than his Golden Eagles contract, with no incentive
bonuses or paid expenses—a far less attractive package than the
one than he had accepted from the Golden Eagles a month
earlier.112
2. The Procedural History of the Lutz Decision
Lutz filed suit in the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania on August 30, 2017 against Rakuten
and the Golden Eagles alleging: (1) fraud; (2) negligent misrepre-
sentation; and (3) promissory estoppel.113  On November 30, 2017,
Rakuten and the Golden Eagles responded by filing a Motion to
Dismiss Lutz’s Complaint under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure for lack of personal jurisdiction and under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for relief.114
On September 11, 2018, the court denied Rakuten and the
Golden Eagles Motion to Dismiss without prejudice and allowed the
parties to conduct jurisdictional discovery for a period of 60 days.115
After completing jurisdictional discovery, Rakuten and the Golden
Eagles were permitted to renew their Motion to Dismiss to deter-
mine whether the underlying merits of the case could be litigated
jurisdictionally in Pennsylvania.116
109. See id. at ¶ 53.
110. See id. at ¶ 55.
111. See id.
112. See id. at ¶¶ 58–59.
113. See generally Compl., supra note 33.
114. See generally Defendants Rakuten Baseball, Inc.’s, Rakuten, Inc.’s, and
Hiroshi Mikitani’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Under
12(b)(2); Dismiss or Stay Pending Resolution of a Parallel Proceeding in Japan
and on Grounds of Forum Non Conveniens; and Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
Under Rule 12(b)(6), Lutz v. Rakuten, Inc., No. 5:17-cv-03895-CFK, 2017 WL
11516381 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2017), ECF No. 11.
115. See generally Order that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is Denied Without
Prejudice, Lutz, No. 5:17-cv-03895-CFK (E.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2018), ECF No. 23.
116. See id.
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The deadline for jurisdiction discovery was briefly extended
while the parties exchanged additional documents.117  On January
25, 2019 Rakuten and the Golden Eagles filed their renewed Mo-
tion to Dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)
and (6).118  Lutz filed his response on February 11, 2019.119
Rakuten and the Golden Eagles filed a Reply on February 15, 2019,
and Lutz filed a Sur-Reply on February 17, 2019.120
a. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(2)
The crux of Rakuten’s and the Golden Eagles’ argument was
that the federal court lacked both specific personal and general ju-
risdiction under Federal Rule 12(b)(2) over both Japanese entities
such that litigation in a Pennsylvania court would violate constitu-
tional principles of due process.121  Specific personal jurisdiction
requires a defendant to have sufficient “minimum contacts” with a
state and that the claims arise out of those contacts.122  General ju-
risdiction subjects a defendant to jurisdiction if its non-claim-re-
lated contacts with a state are so continuous and systematic that the
defendant is considered to be “at home” there.123
Rakuten and the Golden Eagles contended that the federal
court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over them because
neither entity conducts business or has a physical location in Penn-
117. See generally Order That Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Discovery
Deadline on Jurisdictional Issues is Granted, Lutz, No. 5:17-cv-03895-CFK (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 29, 2018), ECF No. 35.
118. See generally Defendants Rakuten, Inc. and Rakuten Baseball, Inc.’s Re-
newed Motion to Dismiss: (1) For Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Under Rule
12(b)(2) and (2) For Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6), Lutz, 2019 WL
8370826, ECF No. 42.
119. See generally Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defend-
ants’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss, Lutz, 2019 WL 8370825, ECF No. 44.
120. See generally Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants Rakuten,
Inc.’s and Rakuten Baseball, Inc.’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss, Lutz, 2019 WL
2549538, ECF No. 45; Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Re-
newed Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, Lutz, 2019 WL 8370831, ECF No.
48.
121. See generally Memorandum in Support of Defendants Rakuten, Inc.’s and
Rakuten Baseball’s Inc.’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss: (1) For Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction Under Rule 12(b)(2) and (2) For Failure to State a Claim Under Rule
12(b)(6), Lutz, 2019 WL 8370826, ECF No. 42.
122. See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126–27 (2014); see also
O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 312, 316–17 (3d Cir. 2007)
(explaining that specific personal jurisdiction requires defendant to have purpose-
fully directed its activities to, arise out of one of those activities directed to, and is
fair and reasonable to haul defendant into forum state).
123. See Damler, 571 U.S. at 128 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) and Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, Inc.,
566 F.3d 324, 334 (3d Cir. 2009)).
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sylvania, and because the Golden Eagles representatives did not set
foot in Pennsylvania to negotiate with Lutz over the terms of a con-
tract for the 2015 season.124  The Golden Eagles further contended
that their contacts with Lutz were location-agnostic; they communi-
cated with Lutz without direct knowledge of where Lutz was physi-
cally located at the time.125  As it relates to Rakuten, the corporate
parent also argued that its representatives were not involved in the
contract negotiations with Lutz at all and therefore had no “con-
tacts” with Pennsylvania.126
Both Rakuten and the Golden Eagles asserted general personal
jurisdiction over them was improper because they do not engage in
business that directly targets or solicits Pennsylvania residents.127
b. Lutz’s Response to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
In opposition, Lutz argued specific personal jurisdiction was
proper because representatives from the Golden Eagles communi-
cated “directly and frequently” with him concerning his injury and
a new contract for the 2015 season while he was in Pennsylvania,
citing dozens of e-mail, text message, and telephone exchanges
throughout the fall of 2014.128
Lutz also argued general personal jurisdiction over Rakuten
was appropriate because Rakuten overtly promotes on its website all
of its business endeavors—the integrated nature of the multitude of
“services” provided by its affiliates in the United States—are part of
its global “ecosystem” that markets the Rakuten brand internation-
ally, including in Pennsylvania.129
124. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants Rakuten, Inc.’s and Rakuten
Baseball’s Inc.’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss: (1) For Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
Under Rule 12(b)(2) and (2) For Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6),
Lutz, 2019 WL 8370826, at *1–2, ECF No. 42 (contending that Rakuten was not
involved with Lutz’s negotiations and Golden Eagles did not travel to Pennsylvania
to negotiate terms of contract for 2015 season).
125. See id. at *13–14 (arguing that Golden Eagles did not know “if Lutz was
in Pennsylvania, or elsewhere” while negotiating his contract for 2015 season).
126. See id. at *16 (“There is no evidence that Rakuten, Inc. was involved in
negotiations with Lutz, much less in Pennsylvania.”).
127. See id. at *9 (arguing that Rakuten and its subsidiaries do not “conduct
business, file tax returns or administrative reports, regularly purchase products or
supplies, own land, advertise, or maintain an agent in Pennsylvania”).
128. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Re-
newed Motion to Dismiss, Lutz, 2019 WL 8370825, at *1–4, ECF No. 44 (detailing
extensive negotiations that Golden Eagles senior management had with Lutz be-
tween September 2014 and January 2015 while he was rehabilitating from his in-
jury in Pennsylvania).
129. See id. at *17–21.
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  3. The Lutz Decision
On April 22, 2019, the court issued a detailed opinion holding
the federal court had specific personal jurisdiction over the Golden
Eagles but lacked either specific or general personal jurisdiction
over Rakuten.130  The court found the Golden Eagles “knowingly
reached into Pennsylvania to recruit and employ [Lutz] to play
baseball for the Golden Eagles.”131  The court found it had specific
personal jurisdiction over the Golden Eagles because it “purpose-
fully directed its activities at Pennsylvania” by: (1) knowing Lutz was
a Pennsylvania resident, evidenced by the fact they wired money to
his Pennsylvania bank account for his 2014 salary; and (2) commu-
nicating via e-mail, text message, and telephone with him while he
was in Pennsylvania related to his recovery from surgery and negoti-
ations over the 2015 contract.132
The court, however, determined that it lacked personal juris-
diction over Rakuten.133  There was no specific personal jurisdic-
tion because Lutz’s allegations implicated only the negotiations
with the Golden Eagles, not Rakuten.134  The court also lacked gen-
eral personal jurisdiction over Rakuten because the parent com-
pany does not directly, at the parent level, sell any goods or services
in Pennsylvania, have any offices in Pennsylvania, or directly target
or solicit Pennsylvania consumers.135
The court also applied the test set forth in Zippo Mfg. Co. v.
Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,136 because of Rakuten’s extensive divisions and
consolidated subsidiaries across the globe, to consider whether
Rakuten’s website subjected it to personal jurisdiction.137   While
recognizing that Rakuten overtly promotes its integrated global
“ecosystem” on its website, the court determined that this was a pas-
sive form of marketing that was “more akin to an advertisement of
130. See generally Lutz v. Rakuten, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 3d 455 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
131. Id. at 465.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 465–66.
134. See id. at 466 (determining that court lacked specific personal jurisdic-
tion over Rakuten because “there are no allegations that Rakuten’s contacts with
Pennsylvania in any way affected the negotiations between Plaintiff and Rakuten
Baseball”).
135. See id. at 467 (explaining that Rakuten does not have “continuous and
systemic affiliations with Pennsylvania that would essentially render it at home in
Pennsylvania”).
136. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
137. See id. at 468 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp.
1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997)).
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the overall Rakuten brand.”138  The court refused to attribute to
Rakuten the activities of websites operated by its wholly-owned and
indirect subsidiaries even though those websites bear the Rakuten
name and logo and promote the overarching Rakuten brand.139  In
so doing, the court endorsed the notion that an international con-
glomerate could be subject to personal jurisdiction if its marketing
strategy targets citizens of a particular state and is central to its
business.140
Although the court dismissed Rakuten on jurisdictional
grounds, the court denied the Golden Eagles’ Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tion, allowing Lutz’s claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
and promissory estoppel against the Golden Eagles to proceed.141
Less than three months after the Lutz decision, the parties resolved
their dispute.142
The Lutz decision—while persuasive authority—is not binding
on other courts.  There are strategic reasons why both sides would
want to avoid any appellate review of the District Court’s decision.
Any appeal by the Golden Eagles would have created the risk that
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit would have affirmed the
District Court’s opinion, thereby setting a precedent for all federal
courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands, in addition to creating a highly influential decision for all
other federal courts.  In any such appeal, Lutz unquestionably
would have filed a cross-appeal asking the Third Circuit to deter-
mine the propriety of the dismissal of Rakuten—a request that
would have allowed the appellate court to take a closer look at the
record evidence of Rakuten’s deep business entwinement with its
subsidiaries in the United States.
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LUTZ DECISION GOING FORWARD
The Lutz decision opens the door for U.S.-based professional
athletes to litigate employment disputes against foreign profes-
sional teams, and potentially the international conglomerates that
138. See id. at 469–70.
139. See id. at 470.
140. See id. at 469 (identifying that Rakuten could be subject to personal juris-
diction if its website and marketing strategy specifically targeted Pennsylvania and
its website and marketing were central to its business in Pennsylvania).
141. See id. at 476 (holding that Lutz’s “claims have been sufficiently pled,
allowing his causes of action to proceed to discovery”).
142. See generally Settlement Conference and Order Dismissing Action with
Prejudice Pursuant to Local Rule 41.1(b), Lutz v. Rakuten, Inc., No. 5:17-cv-03895-
CFK (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2019), ECF Nos. 65–66.
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own them, in American courts.  By actively reaching into a state to
recruit and employ an athlete, such actions may be considered to
be “purposefully directed” at the state and may subject the foreign
teams to jurisdiction there.  This is a crucial development for the
legal rights of U.S.-based professional athletes and it should present
substantial concern for foreign professional sports teams.
A. Expanding Players’ Legal Rights
The Lutz decision expands the legal rights of professional ath-
letes because litigating in foreign jurisdictions to resolve employ-
ment disputes is cost prohibitive and logistically challenging.143
These challenges include an unfamiliar legal system, reduced ac-
cess to legal representation, the need for a language interpreter,
travel expenses, and uncertainty about litigation outcomes.144  The
court explicitly acknowledged the financial and procedural barriers
for athletes to litigate in foreign jurisdictions in the Lutz decision,
specifically stating it would pose a significant burden on Lutz to
bring his claims in Japan, while the Golden Eagles would face a
“substantially smaller burden” to defend themselves in
Pennsylvania.145
Another potentially insurmountable challenge for professional
athletes litigating employment disputes abroad is the foreign team’s
political influence, which often results in the player having no legal
redress.146  By way of example, Dan Grunfield, a United States bas-
ketball player who played professionally in Europe, described this
overwhelming challenge as follows: “The owner of the team had a
143. See Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come with Responsibilities: Personal Jurisdic-
tion in the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 161 (2013) (detail-
ing importance of plaintiff’s litigation in American courts against foreign
corporations).
144. See id.
145. See Lutz v. Rakuten, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 3d 455, 465, 476 (E.D. Pa. 2019)
(“Rakuten Baseball is a sophisticated corporation that has the resources to defend
this matter in Pennsylvania. The relative finances of Rakuten Baseball compared to
Plaintiff’s finances is an overwhelming factor that supports the Court’s exercise of
personal jurisdiction over Rakuten Baseball.”).
146. See Matthew J. Mitten & Hayden Opie, “Sports Law”: Implications for the
Development of International, Comparative, and National Law and Global Dispute Resolu-
tion, 85 TUL. L. REV. 269, 311 (2010) (explaining alternative dispute resolution); see
also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (explain-
ing that “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effect relief” is impor-
tant consideration for courts to evaluate when determining whether to exercise
personal jurisdiction); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (con-
cluding that considerations of justice requires plaintiffs to litigate in the United
States because “individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost of bring-
ing an action in a foreign forum – thus in effect making the company judgment
proof”).
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lot of political influence in the region, and not surprisingly, the
courts ruled in favor of the team.”147
Litigating abroad also creates legal challenges for professional
athletes as there is a lack of international uniformity regarding con-
tract law.148  Professional teams abroad—in contrast to the United
States—often deprive players of guaranteed contractual pay-
ments.149  Thus, foreign professional teams commonly release play-
ers based on their subjective perception that the player is not
meeting expectations or the determination that the team is not
profiting from the player’s services.150  While several foreign sports
leagues have governing bodies that arbitrate contractual disputes,
teams are still not deterred from failing to pay players because of
the lack of uniformity in international contract law and the logisti-
cal challenges U.S. athletes face.151
The issue of failing to pay professional athletes abroad was
highlighted in a 2012 study conducted by FIFPro—the interna-
tional football players’ union—which determined more than forty-
one percent of Eastern European soccer teams did not pay their
players on time, and more than fifty percent of the players did not
receive their bonuses on time.152  Even worse, an astounding
ninety-four percent of players in Montenegro did not get their sala-
ries on time, and over sixty-six percent of the players in Greece re-
ported the same.153  Nor are U.S.-based athletes immune.  Brandon
Jennings, a former NBA player, signed a $1.2 million contract with
a top professional team in Italy in 2008 and only got paid “on time
147. Dan Grunfield, Payment Uncertainty Looms Large When You’re Ballin’ Over-
seas, SB NATION (Sept. 20, 2011), https://www.sbnation.com/nba/2011/9/20/
2436043/nba-overseas-payment-dan-grunfeld [https://perma.cc/U4ZF-CKJV]
(highlighting risks of player overseas compared to at home).
148. See Mitten & Opie, supra note 146, at 270.
149. See Creepy, supra note 19 (identifying that professional teams abroad
“routinely breach contracts”).
150. See id. (explaining that “teams routinely will cut a player, or withhold his
salary, if they perceive he is not playing at the level they think he should be . . . the
team has full discretion”).
151. See Zach Schreiber, The Right to Play: How Sports Leagues Worldwide Interfere
with the Fundamental Right to Work, 25 SPORTS LAW. J. 19, 40–41 (2018) (explaining
“a wide variety” of legal concerns and “an uphill battle against legal challenges in a
court of law”).
152. See FIFPRO, FIFPRO BLACK BOOK: EASTERN EUROPE, at 10. (2012), availa-
ble at http://www.lefigaro.fr/assets/pdf/fifpro.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD5E-
XUEW] (detailing the frequency that professional teams abroad circumvent from
their legal obligations to compensate athletes).
153. See id.
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once.”154  ESPN also detailed the challenges of U.S.-based basket-
ball players pursuing their careers abroad, identifying that most
players “have at least one story about not getting paid.”155
Since foreign professional teams do not make timely or justly
contractual payments to players, the Lutz decision can expand the
rights for U.S.-based professional athletes by enabling them to liti-
gate in American courts.  The increased popularity of professional
athletes on social media platforms and the globalization of the la-
bor markets in professional sports will make the recruitment of
U.S.-based athletes by foreign teams more common.156  When for-
eign professional teams knowingly communicate with a U.S.-based
athlete for the purposes of recruitment and employment, creative
pleading can expand legal rights by enabling a putative plaintiff to
circumvent potential contract law issues (e.g., mandatory arbitra-
tion in a foreign jurisdiction) by asserting claims—as Lutz did—for
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel.
B. Potential Liability for International Conglomerates
Foreign professional sports teams, especially those in Asia, are
frequently owned by international conglomerates that use the team
to promote their overall brand through the team’s exposure to con-
sumers.  To the extent that these foreign entities target American
consumers through their global branding strategies, they may be
subject to personal jurisdiction in American courts, especially if
there is fact driven evidence of their deep involvement and
entwinement with the operational and business activities of their
affiliates that operate here.
The court in Lutz did not give adequate consideration to
Rakuten’s collection and processing of customer data, including
demographics, search and browsing history and purchase history,
from its 120 million members in the United States.  As noted,
Rakuten runs this “Big Data” through its “Rakuten Analytics
Tracker” and its member “Behavior Log,” and uses the results to
forecast demand for the goods and services offered by its U.S affili-
154. See Ray Glier, Brandon Jennings Sends Home a Warning from Europe, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 23, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/24/sports/basketball/
24recruit.html [https://perma.cc/2XMK-KLR5] (noting concerns).
155. Thomas Neumann, Oh, The Places They Went – Strange Tales From Ameri-
cans Playing Pro Basketball’s Underbelly, ESPN (Jan. 25, 2017), https://
www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/18497433/oh-places-went-strange-tales-americans-
playing-pro-basketball-globe [https://perma.cc/XWR9-G44Y] (elaborating con-
cerns in particular with payment for athletes).
156. See Mitten & Opie, supra note 146, at 310.
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ates to optimize inventory and pricing, and to target its members
for discounts and coupons.  Certainly, many of those 120 million
members reside in Pennsylvania and are directly impacted by this
collection and processing of their data by Rakuten.
Nor did the court address the possible implications of the Su-
preme Court’s decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.157 in its anal-
ysis of personal jurisdiction under the twenty-three year old Zippo
test.158  In Wayfair, the Supreme Court upheld the power of states to
impose and collect sales tax on out-of-state sellers with no physical
presence in the state who ship goods into the state.159  The holding
in Wayfair is narrowly focused, rooted in the policy interests of the
state’s ability to collect much needed tax revenue and the inequity
of any “physical presence rule,” which would give out-of-state busi-
nesses a competitive advantage over their in-state counterparts.160
However, there are relevant points of discussion in Wayfair that
might question the continued relevance of the Zippo analysis.161  In
applying the Zippo test to determine personal jurisdiction based on
website activity, the court in Lutz applied a “sliding scale” analysis,
looking at whether the websites specifically targeted Pennsylvania
residents and whether those activities were central to the Rakuten’s
business in the Commonwealth.162  The court opined that by itself,
the establishment of a website where Pennsylvania residents could
purchase goods was insufficient to establish general jurisdiction.163
Wayfair seems to take an alternate view of the significance of
“presence” as it relates to interactivity through the internet.164  The
Supreme Court stated that such a nexus is established when a busi-
ness avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business
in that jurisdiction: “[T]he nexus is clearly sufficient based on both
the economic and virtual contacts [the businesses] have with the
State,” particularly in this era of an “increasingly interconnected
economy.”165
157. 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
158. See id. (analyzing Commerce Clause implications); Lutz v. Rakuten, Inc.,
376 F. Supp. 3d 455, 468 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997)).
159. See generally Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
160. See id.
161. See, e.g., Lutz, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 468 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot
Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997)).
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See generally Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (defining presence).
165. Id. at 2099 (noting although Supreme Court’s review of state taxing au-
thority in Wayfair was conducted under Commerce Clause, Supreme Court hinted
that its analysis might have more broad applicability under Due Process Clause on
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Wayfair also recognizes the impact of technological changes on
prior doctrine.  In contrast to the Lutz court’s “passive-interactive-
active” analysis under Zippo, the Supreme Court in Wayfair empha-
sized the “far-reaching systemic and structural changes in the econ-
omy and many other societal dimensions caused by the Cyber
Age.”166  This observation may suggest a shift in the role of websites
in the personal jurisdiction analysis and, in particular, the contin-
ued viability of the “targeting state residents” and “central to the
business” requirements for personal jurisdiction relied on by the
court in Lutz.167
V. CONCLUSION
Reaching into a state through e-mail, text message, and tele-
phone communications with a professional athlete based in the
United States can give rise to personal jurisdiction over foreign pro-
fessional sports teams that participate in those communications.  Ju-
risdiction over their corporate owners is less clear.  As a matter of
simple common sense, should an international conglomerate—one
who compares itself to Google and Facebook and who saturates the
United States with television commercials and signs high profile
sponsorship and endorsement deals with equally high profile pro-
fessional athletes and sports teams here—escape jurisdiction be-
cause it does not specifically target Pennsylvania residents for the
menu of “services” offered by its affiliates in its integrated global
“ecosystem?”  Under the court’s decision in Lutz, by aggressively
promoting its brand, logo and businesses throughout the entire
United States, Rakuten has essentially immunized its conduct from
scrutiny by any court here.
The court in Lutz held that the exercise of such jurisdiction was
inappropriate unless the company specifically targets residents of
Pennsylvania and its marketing strategy is central to its business.
While the court, without much discussion of the actual evidence
produced by Lutz, found these jurisdictional requirements defi-
cient, it is questionable whether this is the proper analysis at all.
which, as in Lutz); see also id. at 2093 (challenging personal jurisdiction grounded:
“Due Process and Commerce Clause standards may not be identical or cotermi-
nous, but there are significant parallels.”).
166. Id. at 2097.
167. See Lutz, 376 F. Supp. at 468 (discussing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot
Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997)).
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